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Repositioning the Cause of the Civil War
According to Stanley Harrold’s important new book, Border War: Fighting
over Slavery before the Civil War, from nearly the moment of its birth, the
United States was home to a “border war" along the boundary separating North
and South. The eleven states that touched this border clashed repeatedly over the
issue of slavery, especially the issue of fugitive slaves. This conflict “had a
profound impact on American life, culture, and politics," Harrold argues. “It
helped shape the sectional struggle, the Civil War, and how that war proceeded"
(xii).
Limited at first to political and judicial skirmishes over the return of
fugitives to their masters, the border war escalated during the 1840s and 1850s
into actual armed battles between residents of the borderlands. Planters in the
lower South may have complained loudly about runaway slaves and the northern
whites who assisted them, but slave owners in the lands closest to the North—the
Border South—were the ones who suffered real damage as a result of slave
escapes. Hence, when interstate diplomacy and the actions of state governments
failed to provide adequate security for the property rights of slaveholders, whites
in the Border South demanded federal action both to assist in the recovery of
fugitive slaves and to prevent northerners from interfering with that process. The
fabled unionism of the Border South rested, more than anything else, on faith
that the power of the federal government provided the greatest possible security
against the threat posed to slavery by runaway slaves and the Underground
Railroad.
As Harrold’s story enters the crisis years of the sectional controversy,
1848-1861, it becomes clear that Border War amounts to nothing less than a
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reorientation of our understanding of the coming of the Civil War. In Harrold’s
telling, the fundamental cause of the Civil War was not the somewhat abstract
debate about the extension of slavery into the far western territories—a
controversy over an “imaginary negro in an impossible place," as Daniel
Webster judged it. Instead, the real cause of the war was the border war over
fugitive slaves. Harrold argues that “‘the two most Union-shattering
controversies of the 1850s’"—the Fugitive Slave Law and Bleeding Kansas
episode—“originated in the border struggle" (164). In regard to the Fugitive
Slave Law, the federal government acceded to the demands of Border South
masters for protection against northerners who interfered with the recovery of
fugitives. In the case of Bleeding Kansas, the effort of slaveholders in Missouri
to prevent Kansas from turning into a haven for fugitives led, first, to the
adoption of popular sovereignty for the new territory through the passage of the
Kansas-Nebraska Act and, second, to bloodshed, as “border ruffians" from
Missouri used violence and intimidation in an effort to prevent Kansas from
becoming a free territory that might harbor runaway slaves.
To whites in the Border South, John Brown’s Raid at Harper’s Ferry,
Virginia, in 1859 “seemed to be the logical product of years of abolitionist
involvement in slave escapes and more recent assaults" on their region (185).
Most whites saw the actions of Brown, a veteran of warfare in Kansas and
instigator of spectacular slave rescues from the Border South, “in the context of a
losing struggle against northern aggression" (193). As the furor provoked by
John Brown’s Raid grew into rage over Abraham Lincoln’s election thirteen
months later, many white southerners from the borderlands continued to insist
that the federal union, not secession from it, offered the best security for slavery
against the threat posed by runaway slaves and their northern abettors. This
attitude, born out of the border war, was “crucial in keeping most of the Border
South in the Union" (211). And, the refusal of the Border South to secede likely
doomed the Confederacy from the outset of the war.
In writing Border War, Harrold has produced a first-rate example of a genre
of historical writing all too often ignored in our age of highly specialized local
studies: a synthesis. By drawing together recent scholarship with his own
prodigious, original research, the author enables us to see a pattern that has been
nearly invisible, the enduring and frequent conflict among people along the
sectional border and the importance of that conflict to the larger national scene.
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Harrold’s synthesis rests upon an outpouring of new scholarship on the
Underground Railroad. Fifty years ago, Larry Gara’s The Liberty Line (The
University of Kentucky Press, 1961) taught historians to be wary of the legend of
the Underground Railroad. The traditional story of heroic “operators"
clandestinely carrying “passengers" from “station" to “station" along secret
escape routes, Gara argued, was largely a romantic fable that could not bear
under critical scrutiny. Historians learned this lesson well, but not the general
public, which continues to cherish the romantic fable, adding to it in recent years
the poorly documented notion that secretly coded quilts were widely used to
guide slaves safely along the path to freedom. If Gara taught scholars to be
skeptical of the Underground Railroad, they may have learned the lesson too
well—as Gara himself later acknowledged—by undervaluing genuine, organized
efforts to help slaves escape. Stanley Harrold has been in the forefront of a new
scholarly effort to reexamine the Underground Railroad, to recognize that behind
the legend lies the real story of “organized escape networks" (172), and it is this
new scholarship that Border War draws upon so effectively.
Border War is also part of the emerging effort by scholars to reconfigure the
very idea of politics, to see it not simply as competition for governmental power
between organized parties, but as any activity that might affect the distribution of
power in any institutional or group setting. This new view helps us recognize
that marginalized, disfranchised groups retain an ability to engage in politics,
thereby shaping history and affecting the course of their own lives. In the
historiography of slavery, this new view asserts the importance of black political
agency. Border War, by demonstrating that escape networks were biracial in
nature and that African Americans played a central role in operating those
networks, shows how perhaps the most marginalized group in American society
could alter the course of history.
In this regard, it should be noted that Gara’s original point was not to
minimize the importance of fugitive slaves or to dismiss all efforts to assist them,
but instead to refocus our attention away from the whites who occasionally
rescued slaves to the slaves themselves. Most fugitives, Gara argued, got away
by relying on their own pluck and ingenuity, with very little, if any, assistance
from whites. And whatever assistance they received from fellow blacks was
usually spontaneous, rendered without the planning or sponsorship of any
organized group.
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By emphasizing the centrality of organized escape networks rather than the
actions of individual slaves, the effect of Border War—whether intentional or
not—is to minimize the importance of these primary actors. While looking for
sources of tension within the borderlands, the book also overlooks other actions
by slaves with political implications, actions even more widespread than slave
escapes: ordinary, daily acts of slave resistance. These actions—encouraged,
whites believed, by northern antislavery activism—threatened a breakdown of
plantation discipline, awakening fears of an impending racial war unless the
slave population was better controlled. The prospect of bloody insurrection by
slave rebels seemed more threatening than massive property losses caused by
fugitive slaves.
In asserting the central importance of escape networks to the events that
preceded the Civil War, Border War comes up against the limitations of current
scholarship. Harrold is usually forced to rely upon impressionistic evidence on
the size and extent of the Underground Railroad. We desperately need more
works that bring together all that can be known presently about the Underground
Railroad, works that measure its size and scope and assess the extent to which
fugitives received assistance from escape networks. We need more scholarship
that brings clarity to the organizational structure of the escape networks that
made up the genuine Underground Railroad, a loose, weblike complex of
vigilance committees, fugitive aid and Canadian emigration societies, black
churches, organized rescues of captured fugitives, and clandestine abolitionist
forays into the South. Until we have this scholarship, it is difficult to affirm
Harrold’s argument that whites in the Border South were reacting to a real threat
provoked by widespread, effective underground railroad activity rather than
simply overreacting to a mostly symbolic threat.
Additionally, Border War runs into the challenge scholars invariably face
when trying to extend the slavery issue past the secession crisis into the war
itself. Decades of research have conclusively demonstrated the centrality of
slavery in causing the sectional crisis and pushing the South to secede from the
Union. Border War adds even more heft to the body of evidence that proves the
importance of slavery in the coming of the Civil War. Yet, once secession
occurred, many new factors emerged that affected the issue of loyalty or
disloyalty to the Union. For most Americans, no straight line connected their
prewar positions on slavery to the stance they took throughout the long course of
the war.
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To take one example suggested by Harrold’s argument, if the fugitive slave
issue was the principle one driving the United States to the brink of Civil War,
why did the southern states that experienced the greatest anger over this
issue—those of the Border South—prove to be the southern states that were most
loyal to the Union? Why did the people of the Border South, after years of
engaging in heated, and often armed, conflict with northerners over fugitive
slaves suddenly join forces with those same northerners against fellow
slaveholders in the Cotton States? For that matter, why were the people of the
Border North, those most likely to have engaged in prewar battles with the South
over fugitive slaves, also the northerners most likely to demonstrate sympathy
for the South during the Civil War? Harrold’s answer for the Border South is that
its unionism was based on the belief that the greatest security for slavery was the
protection offered by the federal government. While acknowledging that many
other factors contributed to Border South unionism, including military coercion,
Harrold insists on the primacy of the issue of fugitive slaves, a prioritization of
issues that is unconvincing. By picturing a mostly proslavery Border South
facing off against a mostly antislavery Border North, Harrold does not
sufficiently acknowledge the complexity of views within the border regions.
These reservations, however, should not distract us from the importance of
Border War in charting new directions in the history of the Civil War era.
Stanley Harrold has written an excellent book that is sure to prompt debate and
additional research. It will be required reading for historians of the slavery
controversy in the United States.
Harold D. Tallant is Professor of History at Georgetown College. He is the
author of Evil Necessity: Slavery and Political Culture in Antebellum Kentucky
and is currently working on a book on slavery and religion in the American
sectional crisis.
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